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REASONABLE BEHAVIOR AT THE CFPB 
Norman I. Silber* 
INTRODUCTION 
Deceptive Behavior and Consumer Regulation 
The impetus for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, an agency 
charged with diminishing deceit in the marketplace for financial products, 
has antecedents that stretch back into the distant past. The ancient Greeks 
were troubled by deceitful marketing practices—recall that Diogenes, 
walking up and down the marketplace, searched in vain for an honest man.1 
Over the centuries, however, political leaders have usually resigned 
themselves to the persistence of unethical practices by tradesmen, 
considering these to be the insuppressible by-product of the contest between 
buyers and sellers that takes place whenever bargains are formed.2 
American courts, notwithstanding the invocation of privity 
requirements and doctrines like caveat emptor, have been willing to provide 
recourse to victims of actual fraud, at root because sales transactions rooted 
in deceit have never been culturally popular or understood to be 
economically beneficial.3 During most of the nineteenth century, states and 
localities took responsibility for regulating markets to establish honest 
weights and measures and to promote honesty.4 The federal government, 
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 1. “On one bright, clear day, Diogenes was walking up and down the market place, holding a 
lighted lantern high in front of him and peering around as if searching for something. When 
people gaped and asked him what he was doing, he replied, ‘I am looking for an honest man.’” 
David Quinn, Teachings of Diogenes, http://members.optushome.com.au/davidquinn000 
/Diogenes%20Folder/Diogenes.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (recounting a story told of 
Diogenes). 
 2. See generally NORMAN I. SILBER, TEST AND PROTEST: THE INFLUENCE OF CONSUMERS 
1–16 (1983) (addressing the role in the United States of one of the first consumer products testing 
agencies); Norman I. Silber, From The Jungle to The Matrix: The Future of Consumer Protection 
in Light of its Past, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 15, 
15–34 (Jane K. Winn ed. 2006) [hereinafter Silber, From The Jungle to The Matrix] (twentieth 
century developments). See also Spencer Weber Waller et al., Consumer Protection in the US: An 
Overview, 2011 EUR. J. CONS. L. 853, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000226 (providing 
an overview of the history of consumer protection). 
 3. Jonathan Sheldon, Deception, Unfair and Unconscionable Sales Practices, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 208 (Stephen Brobeck et al. eds. 1997); see also 
In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1056 (1984) (“[Deception] is harmful to consumers, 
undermines the rational functioning of the marketplace, and, unlike some other practices we are 
called upon to review, never offers increased efficiency or other countervailing benefits that must 
be considered.”).  
 4. JESSE VEE COLES, THE CONSUMER-BUYER AND THE MARKET 519 (1978).  
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responding to new circumstances as monopolies and mass production 
turned consumer problems into national phenomena, authorized indepen-
dent agencies to foster competition, promote honesty in merchandising, and 
mandate product safety.5 
Many consumer problems come to public attention most vividly in 
novels. The perils of unregulated mortgage markets received their first 
brilliant exposure in Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel The Jungle.6 Those who 
remember The Jungle will recall that the protagonist, Jurgis Rudkis, and 
others in his immigrant family, looked forward as much as anything else to 
buying a home when they came to America, and they pooled their resources 
to come up with a down payment.7 But the process of buying a house was 
frightening to them—with one snare after another. They became suspicious 
of everyone with whom they dealt, and were scared of the documents they 
were asked to sign. 
A lawyer, who might—or might not—be reliable, assured the family 
that the agreement they had been presented was a “standard” agreement of 
sale, despite language which, they feared, signified that it was a rental. They 
were relieved by the lawyer’s assurances, and they signed the document, 
without focusing on the high fees and the security provision that the 
agreement contained. Toward the conclusion of The Jungle, illness, tragedy, 
and the fine print have led to a default.8 The home is lost to the mortgagee, 
who forecloses and resells. Sinclair writes poignantly about Yurgis’s 
ultimate defeat: 
Their home! Their home! They had lost it! Grief, despair, rage, 
overwhelmed him—what was any imagination of the thing [compared] to 
this heart-breaking, crushing reality of it—to the sight of strange people 
living in his house hanging their curtains in his windows, staring at him 
with hostile eyes! . . . Only think what he had suffered for that house— 
what miseries they had all suffered for it—the price they had paid for it! 
The whole long agony came back to him. Their sacrifices in the beginning, 
their three hundred dollars that they had scraped together, all they owned 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Silber, From The Jungle to The Matrix, supra note 2 (tracing development of consumer 
protection during the Progressive era). See generally Bernard Schwartz, The Federal Regulatory 
Commissions, in THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES (1973) (development of regulatory agencies); 
MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1995) (providing 
political context); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1977) (discussing original 
motives and capture by industry); RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF 
REGULATORY CHANGE: A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES (1993) (examining the FTC and the EPA); 
THOMAS C. BLAISDELL, JR., THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: AN EXPERIMENT IN THE 
CONTROL OF BUSINESS (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2008) (1932) (emphasizing the gap between 
achievement and original goals). 
 6. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Paul Negri & Josyln T. Pine eds., Dover Publ’n Inc. 2001) 
(1906). 
 7. Id. at ch. 4.  
 8. Id. at ch. 18.  
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in the world, all that stood between them and starvation! And then their 
toil, month by month, to get together the twelve dollars, and the interest as 
well, and now and then the taxes, and the other charges, and the repairs, 
and what not! Why, they had put their very souls into their payments on 
that house, they had paid for it with their sweat and tears—yes, more, with 
their very life-blood. Jurgis could see all the truth now. . . . That first lying 
circular, the smooth-tongued slippery agent. That trap of the extra 
payments, the interest, and all the other charges that they had not the 
means to pay, and would never have attempted to pay! . . . And now, with 
this hideous injustice . . . [the Justice system] had turned them out, bag and 
baggage, and taken their house and sold it again! And they could do 
nothing, they were tied hand and foot—the law was against them, the 
whole machinery of society was at their oppressor’s command!9  
In the end, Upton Sinclair exposes a truth about this consumer financial 
product: that while the purchase agreement and mortgage may or may not 
have been standard, they were unquestionably opaque and oppressive.10 
Efforts to understand why consumer buyers were so frequently 
victimized puzzled commentators, who came to attribute this problem to 
what would now be called inherent relational disparities between buyers 
and sellers. Writing in 1912, Wesley Clair Mitchell observed that 
innovations in productive techniques had improved industrial efficiency and 
turned the manufacturing of consumer demand into a corporate endeavor; 
but factors including love, parental affection, and racial ties cemented 
families together and ensured that consumption was not ever going to be a 
corporate endeavor, but would be, unfortunately, “standardized in the 
institution of monogamy.”11 
In 1938, Congress broadened the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC or 
the Commission) “unfair competition” mandate, making it clear that the 
Commission held a responsibility to police the market for “unfair and 
deceptive practices.”12 It was at this time that the FTC received principal 
federal responsibility not only to preserve and promote fair competition 
among businesses, but to prohibit unfair treatment of consumers.13 The FTC 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Wesley C. Mitchell, The Backward Art of Spending Money, 2 AM. ECON. REV. 269, 270 
(1912). 
 12. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111–14 (1938) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”); see Patricia 
P. Bailey & Michael Pertschuk, The Law of Deception: The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 
849, 870 (1984). Congress expanded the FTC’s power after the Supreme Court ruled that the FTC 
had to prove injury to competition in advertising cases, despite the widespread opposition of the 
newspaper industry. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 649 (1931); Bailey & Pertschuk, 
supra at 870.  
 13. See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and 
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 96 (2003). 
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has risen to this challenge on many occasions, saving the money and 
economic lives of consumers.14 
The subsequent history of the FTC’s consumer protection activities, 
however, reveals periods of passivity as well as periods of active market 
vigilance.15 Part of the difficulty with making an impact on fair dealing in 
consumer markets has been a matter of politics and budgets—the resources 
available to agencies charged with consumer protection have not kept pace 
with the magnitude of the task.16 A more critical impediment has been those 
interpretations of the FTC’s statutory authority that have left many bad acts 
and practices untouched—practices which confuse consumers and 
misrepresent the quality, terms, and price of products.17 
A lenient approach to defining and discouraging “deceptive acts and 
practices” after 1980 reflects, in this view, the Commissioners’ dedication 
to infusing the FTC with a deregulatory spirit and to eschewing the 
prevention of the victimization of the most vulnerable consumers—typical 
consumers who behave normally, but irrationally, in reaction to the 
stimulus of sellers.18 Because of limits that the FTC imposed upon itself in 
this way, which continue to affect the jurisprudence of consumer protection, 
we inhabit a national marketplace where the legal threshold for what is 
“unfair” or “deceptive” does not correspond to our encountered experience 
with unfairness or deception. 
The disconnection between law and experience emanates from rules, 
guidance, and decisions that vindicate only the disappointed expectations of 
consumers who respond “reasonably under the circumstances” to 
salesmanship and that impose expectations of rational behavior to explain 
what “reasonably” means.19 Nonenforcement and under-enforcement have 
                                                                                                                 
 14. The Federal Trade Commission Turns 100, FTC, http://ftc.gov/ftc/turns100/index.shtm 
(last visited Sep. 15, 2012) (providing summaries of FTC milestones from 1914–2003).  
 15. See infra pp. 6–7 and note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Charles of the 
Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC).  
 16. See, e.g., Fighting the F.T.C. Down to the Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1974, at 1; 
Excerpts from Carter and Kennedy Statements on Inflation, Energy and F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
8, 1980, at A16. 
 17. See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 18. For an example of how consumers can behave normally but irrationally, see infra notes 
65–68 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra Part II. The debate between advocates of a rational choice paradigm and 
advocates for appreciation of behavioral economics is decades old. See, e.g., Howard Beales, 
Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J. L. 
& ECON. 491 (1981); Norman I. Silber, Observing Reasonable Consumers: Cognitive Psychology, 
Consumer Behavior, and Consumer Law, 2 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 69 (1990) [hereinafter 
Silber, Observing Reasonable Consumers]; Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral 
Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) (defending rational choice theory); 
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 
(1998); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 
(2006); Christoph Merkle & Martin Weber, True Overconfidence: The Inability of Rational 
Information Processing to Account for Apparent Overconfidence, 116 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 262 (2011). 
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been the result. This has led to a proliferation of objectionable behavior. 
The Commission’s conservative approach to these problems has increased 
the danger and expense of products to consumers, including cars, 
appliances, computers, and product warranties, and has increased the 
number of shoddy financial products, including mortgages, insurance 
policies, credit cards, and investments.20 
In 2010, in response to the recent national financial difficulties spawned 
by under-regulated financial product marketing behavior, Congress created 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or the Bureau) as part of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act (Dodd-Frank or the Act).21 The 
CFPB was charged with improving the overall quality of information and 
honesty in the marketplace for financial products and now holds 
responsibility for making sure that the markets of consumer financial 
products and services offered by both banks and nonbanks are “fair, 
transparent, and competitive.”22 
To enable it to meet its objectives, Congress provided the CFPB with 
extensive supervision, enforcement, and rulemaking authority, including the 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See, e.g., Kimberly Janeway, When Buying Cookware, Count the Pans Not the Pieces, 
CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 16, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://news.consumerreports.org/home/2012/03 
/when-buying-cookware-count-the-pieces.html (warning consumers that cookware sets may have 
“20 pieces, but you can only cook in five” because “[l]ids are included in the tally”); Wrinkle 
Serums Buying Guide, CONSUMER REP., http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/wrinkle-
serums/buying-guide.htm (last updated Mar. 2012) (describing that none of the serums lived up to 
the manufacturers’ claims, but claims are not actionable); Assessing Exercise Infomercials’ 
Claims, CONSUMER REP. (Jan. 2009) http://www.consumerreports.org/health/healthy-living 
/fitness/staying-fit/infomercial-exercise-2-08/how-they-tested/infomercial-exercise-equipment 
-how-they-test.htm (explaining how “miracle” devices failed to live up to claims). Illegal financial 
sales scams of many forms are rampant due to under-staffing and under-enforcement. See, e.g., 
Scamation!; Fraud is on the Rise. Protect Yourself from the Latest Tricks, CONSUMER REP. MAG., 
Oct. 2012, at 22, available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/10/protect 
-yourself-from-the-latest-scams/index.htm. Alternatively, consider the following: 
Even under that more conservative approach, the FTC may establish deception on a 
much lesser showing than is required of a consumer suing a merchant in, say, a 
common law fraud or breach of warranty action. Thus, in contrast with the common law 
rules, the FTC need not show that the merchant has made a false statement (in fact, the 
FTC may find even true claims deceptive); or that the merchant intended to deceive, or 
indeed that anyone relied upon the statement, was deceived by it, or even injured by it. . 
. . It would, in fact, be more accurate to refer to the law of confusing trade practices, 
rather than deceptive trade practices, because the FTC and the courts focus far more on 
confusion than on deception.  
Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC 
Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 444–45 (1991) (footnotes omitted).  
 21. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 1001–1100H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955–2113 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 
12 U.S.C.). See generally Recent Legislation—Administrative Law—Agency Design—Dodd-Frank 
Act Creates the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau—Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010), 124 HARV. L. REV. 2123 (summarizing the creation of the CFPB by the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 22. Dodd-Frank Act § 1021, 124 Stat. at 1979–80 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511). 
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power to prevent “unfair, deceptive, or abusive” acts and practices by 
exercising the authority placed at its disposal.23 Now, if its Director chooses 
to do so, the CFPB has the ability to modernize the jurisprudence of 
unfairness and deceptiveness and endow “abusiveness” with a strong 
meaning that captures a robust understanding of what the term means. It 
can, furthermore, distinguish the restrictive interpretations of reasonable 
consumer behavior in areas outside financial consumer protection from new 
interpretations within the scope of the CFPB’s authority. 
The remainder of this Article offers new possibilities. Part I addresses 
the limited approach to market supervision intrinsic to earlier legal doctrine. 
Part II explains the deficiencies of that jurisprudence in light of several 
decades of research in behavioral psychology. Part III suggests a policy 
shift to reverse current practice by focusing attention on whether sellers in a 
given transaction could have avoided confusing consumers by behaving 
responsibly, instead of focusing on whether buyers could have avoided 
injury by behaving reasonably. 
I. REASONABLE BEHAVIOR AND THE CAPACITY TO DECEIVE 
Among the matters to be decided when consumer protection agencies 
apply the prohibition against deception to the factual circumstances of a 
bargain’s formation are: (1) defining the population of consumers the 
prohibition is intended to protect; (2) establishing a minimal level of 
attentiveness that should be expected from members of the consumer 
population who may be deceived; and (3) identifying the degree of 
falsehood in a seller’s representation that qualifies the representation itself 
as being deceptive. Depending upon the choices made by the agency, the 
protection offered by government will either expand or contract. 
The high water mark for imposing consumer-protective standards for 
marketplace behavior along the three lines mentioned above occurred 
between 1946 and 1983. During this period, the FTC consulted its own 
legislative history and interpreted its responsibility under the governing 
statute to oblige it to protect the entire public—a population which, as the 
U.S. Court of Appeals observed in the case of Charles of the Ritz 
Distributors Corp. v. FTC, included the “ignorant, the unthinking and the 
credulous.”24 
The FTC proceeded on the assumption that consumers did not, and 
should not, be expected to exhibit entirely rational attentiveness to the 
advertisements and representations, or terms and conditions, of the bargains 
they struck. For example, misleading advertising included ads which 
created impressions with the capacity to deceive the unthinking consumer: 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031, 124 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531) (emphasis 
added). 
 24. Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944). 
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If an advertisement is capable of conveying more than one impression to 
the consumer and any one of them is false or misleading, the 
advertisement may be found to be false or misleading. From its own 
review of an advertisement, the Commission may find impressions which 
the advertisement is likely to convey to the public, and determine whether 
such impressions have a tendency or capacity to deceive the public, even 
in cases where a number of consumers may testify that they were not 
actually deceived. In determining the tendency and capacity of an 
advertisement to mislead, the Commission looks to the impression an 
advertisement may make on the average consumer—the gullible and 
unthinking as well as the trained and sophisticated. Indeed, the central 
purpose of Section 5 is “to abolish the rule of caveat emptor which 
traditionally defined rights and responsibilities in the world of 
commerce.”25  
Commissioners took as a point of departure that sellers would often try 
to exploit the weaknesses of consumers—years later, many of these 
weaknesses could be described within the Commission as “cognitive 
limitations”26—and they understood the mission of the FTC as to restrain 
sellers’ inclination to engage in such exploitative behavior. The marketplace 
would be more efficient, and justice served better, by operating under the 
proposition that consumers who did not act with the requisite skills, 
educational background, or emotional level-headedness of the median 
American shopper deserved to be sheltered as much or more than anyone 
else. If sellers were discouraged from making representations which, 
although to some extent truthful, nonetheless had the capacity to deceive, 
this was an acceptable cost of regulation in the interest of safer markets and 
a higher volume of market activity.27 
The appointment of more new commissioners to the FTC by President 
Reagan in the years following his election in 1980, however, ushered in a 
different regime. 28  Against vigorous dissent, a new majority of the 
Commission aligned itself with economists who embraced less market 
regulation and who believed that, to function properly, markets needed to 
                                                                                                                 
 25. In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 266–67 (1983) (footnotes omitted). 
 26. See, e.g., J. Howard Beales, III, Director, Bureau of Consumer Prot., FTC, Address at the 
George Mason Law Review 2004 Symposium on Antitrust and Consumer Protection (Mar. 2, 
2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/040802adstokids.pdf (discussing “the 
cognitive limitations of young children”). 
 27. See, e.g., David A. Rice, Consumer Unfairness at the FTC: Misadventures in Law and 
Economics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1983); J. Howard Beales, III, Brightening the Lines: The 
Use of Policy Statements at the Federal Trade Commission, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1057 (2005). 
 28. President Regan was in office from 1981–1989. During this time, he appointed the 
following FTC Commissioners: James C. Miller III, Terry Calvani, Daniel Oliver, and Janet 
Steiger. Commissioners and Chairmen of the Federal Trade Commission, FTC (Aug. 2012), 
http://ftc.gov/ftc/history/commisionerchartlegal.pdf. 
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encourage reasonable, “rational actors.”29 They believed that the policies 
established by the FTC should allow a maximum possible range for sellers 
to design and market their products, and should encourage all consumers to 
balance costs against benefits to maximize their personal advantage when 
they shopped.30 From this perspective, the functioning of the marketplace 
would not be served well by compensating consumers who were injured 
because they responded irrationally or ignorantly to marketing appeals 
without calculating the costs and benefits. 31  Coddling consumers 
paternalistically would not punish them sufficiently for their poor habits, 
choices, and abilities, and over time would produce poorly functioning 
markets.32 
And so, during the early years of the Reagan administration, the FTC 
issued a Policy Statement to accompany its decision in Cliffdale 
Associates.33 In its Policy Statement, the FTC revised, and in some respects 
reversed, its earlier positions. Notably, the FTC Commissioners defined 
three elements necessary to conclude that actionable deception had 
occurred: 
First, there must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely to 
mislead the consumer. . . .  
Second, we examine the practice from the perspective of a consumer 
acting reasonably in the circumstances. . . .  
Third, the representation, omission, or practice must be a “material” one.34 
Each new requirement diminished the likelihood that a seller might be 
culpable for a deceptive advertising campaign or other sales practice. 
Demanding the establishment of a “likelihood” that a seller was misleading 
a consumer, for instance, imposed a higher threshold than determining 
whether there was a “capacity” to mislead. Requiring “materiality” imposed 
an old common law element of misrepresentation that provided sellers with 
opportunities to claim that their falsehoods did not really matter. Further, 
the second requirement demanded that the practice complained of should 
not simply be deceptive from the perspective of someone who might buy 
the product, but “from the perspective of a consumer acting reasonably in 
                                                                                                                 
 29. This view has been rejected by many economists who would dispute that the efficient 
markets hypothesis requires a commitment to consumer rationality. See, e.g., Robert Shiller, The 
Sickness Beneath the Slump, N.Y.TIMES, Jun. 12, 2011, at BU6. 
 30. See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 324 
(2008). 
 31. Id.  
 32. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY 
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREACRACY 3–16 (2005). 
 33. In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174–84 (1984) (presenting the FTC Policy 
Statement on Deception). 
 34. Id. at 174.  
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the circumstances.” 35  When, if ever, it would be reasonable to act 
irrationally was not explicated. 
Although the Commission continued to take action against the 
egregious deception of the rational and sophisticated, the basic posture of 
the FTC had been transformed. The older test essentially sought to restrain 
sellers from trying to exploit the innate cognitive limitations and ignorance 
of consumers. The new test relaxed that standard by seeking to discover 
whether a consumer who responded to a seller’s representations reasonably 
or rationally would be deceived.36 
The change was indeed dramatic. Less than a decade afterward, the 
“gullible consumer” standard for deception had been thrown into some 
disrepute. Corporate advertisers petitioned the Commission arguing that 
earlier restrictions on their advertising were entered at a time when the 
“gullible” consumer standard prevailed, reflecting “a presumption that 
consumers cannot discern for themselves whether accurate information is 
‘relevant’ or of ‘benefit.’”37 “This now-rejected approach,” it was argued, 
“inhibits the flow of accurate information to consumers without providing 
significant compensating benefits in consumer protection.”38 
The doctrine of unfairness was also reoriented during the Reagan 
administration, which had long been distinguished from “deception” 
jurisprudence.39 In earlier years, the Commission asserted broad authority, 
upheld by the Supreme Court, to create unfair trade practices as a new and 
wide-ranging field of law: 
[The] responsibility of the Commission . . . is a dynamic one: it is charged 
. . . with utilizing its broad powers of investigation and its accumulated 
knowledge and experience in the field of trade regulation to investigate, 
identify, and define those practices which should be forbidden as unfair 
because contrary to the public policy declared in the Act. The 
Commission, in short, is expected to proceed not only against practices 
forbidden by statute or common law, but also against practices not 
previously considered unlawful, and thus to create a new body of law—a 
law of unfair trade practices adapted to the diverse and changing needs of 
a complex and evolving competitive system.40 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id.  
 36. Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2nd Cir. 1944). 
 37. Petition to Vacate Consent Order at *33, In re California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 1994 
F.T.C. Lexis 123 (1994). 
 38. Id. But see Sovern, supra note 20, at 444–45.  
 39. J. Howard Beales, III, The F.T.C’s Use of Unfairness Authority: its Rise, Fall, and 
Resurrection, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/unfair0603.shtm (last modified June 25, 
2007). 
 40. In re All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc., 75 F.T.C. 465, 491 (1969); see also In re Pfizer, Inc., 
81 F.T.C. 23, 61 (1970) (“Unfairness is potentially a dynamic analytical tool capable of a 
progressive, evolving application which can keep pace with a rapidly changing economy. Thus as 
consumers [sic] products and marketing practices change in number, complexity, variety, and 
function, standards of fairness to the consumer may also change.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Shortly after President Reagan appointees dominated, however, the 
Commission trimmed sails by more narrowly redrawing its mission through 
reinterpreting unfair acts and practices. It became incumbent on 
Commission investigators to first evaluate how a sales practice would be 
understood by consumers who were reasonably trying to avoid being 
misled, and then to ask whether the injuries due to unfairness to these 
consumers were outweighed by benefits to these consumers and to the 
market for the products and services being purveyed: 
The Commission felt that one of the most crucial elements in finding an 
act or practice to be unfair was that consumers be injured: (1) the injury 
must be substantial; (2) the injury must not be outweighed by any 
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition produced by the 
practice; and (3) the injury must be an injury that consumers could not 
reasonably have avoided.41 
Congress codified the newer definition of unfairness in 1980.42 The 
Commission stated in policy guidance that substantial injury to consumers 
existed when it could be demonstrated that the practice did “a small harm to 
a large number of people or it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.”43 
As the FTC elaborated its approach in subsequent years, it became evident 
that a finding of unfairness would depend on calculating adverse “net 
effects” of an act or practice, weighing benefits against injuries or a 
significant risk of harm, and giving additional weight to whether 
consumers’ “free market decisions are unjustifiably hindered.”44 
The changes made at the FTC during the years of the Reagan 
administration shifted investigative attention away from the seller’s 
responsibility to design sales practices that did not confuse, exaggerate, or 
conceal qualities and terms, and toward permitting strategies of confusion 
when they did not preclude smart and attentive consumers from averting 
injury.45 
                                                                                                                 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 98-156, pt.1, at 32 (1983). 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006). 
 43. MICHAEL PERTSCHUK ET AL., FTC, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS n.12 
(1980), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm (presenting FTC’s views on 
concept of “unfairness” and appended to In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984)).  
 44. Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,509, 59,513 (Sept. 24, 2010) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt 226) (commenting on the FTC interpretation of FTC Credit Practice Rule, 16 C.F.R.  
§ 444.1 (1999)). 
 45.  
For another thing, California (and federal) case law have been very demanding in terms 
of the kind of evidence needed to prove[] the likelihood of deception. Thus, in Haskell 
v. Time, the court found that declarations from a “few” consumers and a professor of 
rhetoric to be insufficient. In William H. Morris Co. v. Group W, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the plaintiff had not carried its burden where the evidence consisted of 
testimony from two out of 300 recipients. It would be hard to square these proof 
requirements with a substantive rule requiring only proof of a “tendency or capacity” to 
deceive a credulous consumer. 
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A concrete illustration of the shift described here can be drawn from the 
present efforts of well-intentioned FTC agents to pursue deception under 
the present regime. The credit reporting agency ConsumerInfo.com, which 
was acquired by Experian Consumer Direct in April 2002, 46  widely 
advertises a profitable website named FreeCreditReport.com on television, 
in print, and on the Internet. 47  Its target audience includes millions of 
Americans who are concerned about their precarious credit or 
contemplating seeking more credit. Despite its name, 
FreeCreditReport.com is a very costly site.48  
American consumers are entitled to free credit reports from Credit 
Reporting Agencies, which are regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
and other statutes, and may obtain them by using 
AnnualCreditReport.com.49 Every consumer can also obtain credit scores 
without great expense.50 Nevertheless, the Credit Reporting Agencies do not 
widely advertise AnnualCreditReport.com, and Experian-owned 
FreeCreditReport.com, in order to better market its largely superfluous 
products more effectively, does not reveal this information conspicuously—
even after promising to do so.51 The site makes it highly unlikely that a 
consumer will order a “free” report without paying to obtain a score and 
monthly reports for a minimum of $16.99 per month, and much more for 
other reports, scores, and services. 52  As of February, 2010, the Better 
Business Bureau had received more than 11,000 complaints about the 
website.53 
                                                                                                                 
J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, FTC, Deceptive and Unfair Acts and Practices Principles: Evolution 
and Convergence, Address to the California State Bar (May 18, 2007) (footnotes omitted).  
 46. Experian Unit Settles F.T.C. Case and Pays Fine, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at C3. 
 47. See Stephanie Clifford, The High Cost of a ‘Free Credit Report,’ N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2008, at C9. 
 48. See photograph, infra Exhibit A. 
 49. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006). 
 50. Credit Scores, CONSUMER REP. (June 2009), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money 
/credit-loan/credit-scores/overview/credit-scores-ov.htm 
 51. Press Release, FTC, Marketer of “Free Credit Reports” Settles FTC Charges (Aug. 16, 
2005), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2005/08/consumerinfo.shtm.  
 52. FREECREDITREPORT.COM, http://www.freecreditreport.com/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). 
The site does not provide a clear explanation of the difference between a credit score and a credit 
report; and few of those who obtain their credit report through FreeCreditReport.com end up 
doing so without paying amounts that are not easily calculated for unlimited periods of time. See 
supra note 47. In 2010, the FTC enacted a rule “to require certain advertisements for ‘free credit 
reports’ to include prominent disclosures designed to prevent” consumer confusion. Free Annual 
File Disclosures, 75, Fed. Reg. 9,726, 9,726 (Mar. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 610). 
In order to sidestep the required disclosures, Experian began charging $1 for credit reports and 
giving the money to charity. Rob Lieber, Free Report on Credit? No Longer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 
2010, at B1. Fine print at the top of its website indicates that if someone does nothing after 
ordering a $1 credit report, they will be charged $16.99 per month until they terminate the service. 
FREECREDITREPORT.COM, http://www.freecreditreport.com/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).  
 53. Julianne Pepitone, Experian Sued Over FreeCreditReport.com, CNNMONEY.COM (Feb. 4, 
2009, 7:23 PM) http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/04/news/companies/experian_lawsuit 
_freecreditreport/. 
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For more than a decade, the FTC has tried to force Experian to clean up 
its website and to convey information without deception or confusion.54 In 
2005, the FTC entered into a settlement agreement and obtained a small 
disgorgement of funds after filing a complaint.55 But as of the date this 
Article was written, the television ads and website were, in the opinion of 
thousands of people, still misleading, and the FTC has not yet been able to 
successfully address the problem. 
Why is FreeCreditReport.com still allowed to operate? The advertising, 
directed especially at a vulnerable population of debtors, is confusing and 
makes a mockery of the word “free.” The website defends itself on the 
ground that, inter alia, it has not violated any law relating to unfair or 
deceptive practices.56 According to arguments Experian has made in court, 
its websites are educational and the governing “consumer protection 
statutes were not meant to stifle, but to encourage, the free flow of 
educational materials such as the ones it provides.”57 A spokesman for the 
FTC, who was asked why the website is still up, responded that “the agency 
must work within ‘a legal framework,’” and “does not have the power to 
take arbitrary actions.”58 
 
II. THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Academic research into behavioral and cognitive psychology during the 
years since the 1980s has undermined the Commission’s key assumptions 
about the reasonable and rational behavior that is to be expected from 
economic actors.59 Nor did this research support the view that maximizing 
consumer rationality would maximize the efficiency of free markets.60 On 
the contrary, research into cognitive behavior has seriously undermined the 
rational choice paradigm with persuasive evidence that people who behave 
reasonably do not always make optimal, rational choices—consumers who 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Press Release, FTC, supra note 51. 
 55. Id.  
 56. See e.g., Lieber, supra note 52 (“An Experian spokeswoman, Susan Henson, defended the 
new fee. ‘The offer for the $1 report is very clear and in compliance with the F.T.C.’s rule,’ she 
said in an e-mail reply to questions.”). Interestingly, the standard in France is more protective of 
gullible consumers and could potentially prevent Freecreditreport.com from print advertising in 
that nation. Charlotte J. Romano, Comparative Advertising in the United States and in France, 25 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 397–98 (2005) (noting that the current French standard protects 
“credulous, ignorant and unthinking” consumers). I do not know what the rules are for website 
deception. 
 57. Helms v. ConsumerInfo.com, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1232 (N.D. Ala. 2005). 
 58. Bob Sullivan, FTC Fights FreeCreditReport.com with Spoof Ad, THE REDTAPE 
CHRONICLES ON NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 10, 2009, 7:28 PM), http://redtape.msnbc.msn.com/_news 
/2009/03/10/6345777-ftc-fights-freecreditreportcom-with-spoof-ad?lite. 
 59. See e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 19, at 1541.  
 60. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
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are “reasonable under the circumstances” do not characteristically behave 
like rational actors.61 
The “reasonable under the circumstances” standard, as noted earlier, 
developed during the Reagan administration prior to the years when the 
research in behavioral psychology and behavioral economics that 
demonstrated the limits of “rational” choice became well known. As late as 
1990, when efforts to consider the implications of behavioral psychology 
for the development of legal standards started to appear, 62  the legal 
academy had not yet come to grips with the impact of cognitive psychology 
on legal standards of reasonableness in consumer law, criminal law, 
administrative law, or other fields. Not until after 2002, when Daniel 
Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his work in exploring and 
critiquing conventional views about rational choice, did this work prompt a 
flood of attention in legal scholarship.63 
In 2008, Professors Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein 
familiarized the legal academy and the public with the implications of the 
shortcomings of rational choice models in their book Nudge: Improving 
Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness, which presented examples 
of the opportunities of generating incorrect answers by playing on cognitive 
limits and irrationalities.64 A few of their simple illustrations of generated 
cognitive mistakes reveal how easily rational actors are misled into making 
bad choices: 
1. A bat and ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the 
ball. How much does the ball cost? ___cents 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it 
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? ___minutes 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in 
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long 
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? ___days65 
Most people, they write, would say that the answers are “10 cents, 100 
minutes, and 24 days,” respectively.66 As the authors point out, “all these 
answers are wrong,” and they are wrong because of innate processing 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Is It Rational to Assume Consumer Rationality? Some Consumer 
Psychological Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory 48–50 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law & Bus., 
Working Paper No. CLB-00-009, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=239538 (discussing 
how consumers engage in selective attention and how it is difficult to find rationality in 
“tendencies [that] lead consumers to ignore information that it pays them to know and which they 
ought to acquire”). 
 62. See e.g., Silber, Observing Reasonable Consumers, supra note 19.  
 63. See infra app. A. 
 64. RICHARD R. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 22 (2011). 
 65. Id. at 21.  
 66. Id.  
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limitations and because of the way in which the problems are framed to 
generate difficulty in answering them correctly.67 Thaler and Sunstein argue 
that an appreciation of neurological operation and psychology should drive 
policymakers and lawmakers to create rules and regulations that are not 
based on false assumptions about the employment of reason in decision 
making.68 
Today, cognitive “frailties” can be, and frequently are, exploited by 
merchandisers to their advantage.69 Departments of consumer research at 
most major corporations devote substantial effort to learning how to sell 
their products more effectively than their competitors by using 
psychological insights into irrationality, and how to counter logical 
objections consumers might have to purchasing their products.70 Ironically, 
the older approach taken by the FTC, for all its faults and without the 
benefit of the research of recent decades, anticipated this scholarship and 
created a rule that would have been immediately responsive to it.71 The 
FTC’s revised approach undervalued innate aspects of cognitive behavior 
which affect rational action in the face of seller conduct, and crafted the rule 
accordingly.72 
 
III. CFPB AND THE POTENTIAL TO RECREATE THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF DECEPTION, UNFAIRNESS, AND 
ABUSE 
On April 22, 2010, President Obama delivered his landmark address at 
the Cooper Union Auditorium near Wall Street, in which he called upon the 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. at 21–22. By considering the problems more closely they will become easier to solve:  
If the ball costs 10 cents and the bat costs one dollar more than the ball, meaning $1.10, 
then together they cost $1.20, not $1.10. No one who bothers to check whether his 
initial answer of 10 cents could possibly be right would give that as an answer, but 
research by Shane Frederick (2005) (who calls this series of questions the cognitive 
reflection rest) finds that these are the most popular answers even among bright college 
students.  
The correct answers are 5 cents, 5 minutes, and 47 days, but you knew that, or at least 
your Reflective System did if you bothered to consult it. 
Id.  
 68. Id. at 252–53.  
 69. See id. at 144 (“For mortgages, school loans, and credit cards, life is far more complicated 
than it needs to be, and people can be exploited. Often it’s best to ask people to take care of 
themselves, but when people borrow, standard human frailties can lead to serious hardship and 
even disaster.”).  
 70. See, e.g., N. Craig Smith et al., Smart Defaults: From Hidden Persuaders to Adaptive 
Helpers 8–14 (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2009/03/ISIC, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1116650 (discussing marketing ethics and defaults). 
 71. See supra pp. 6–7 (discussing “the high water mark for imposing consumer-protective 
standards for marketplace behavior” between 1946–1983). 
 72. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.  
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financial community to support a major overhaul of financial regulation.73 
In his speech, he attributed the financial crisis to more than unfairness and 
deception: 
[T]his financial crisis wasn’t just the result of decisions made in the 
executive suites on Wall Street; it was also the result of decisions made 
around kitchen tables across America, by folks who took on mortgages 
and credit cards and auto loans. And while it’s true that many Americans 
took on financial obligations that they knew or should have known they 
could not have afforded, millions of others were, frankly, duped. They 
were misled by deceptive terms and conditions, buried deep in the fine 
print.74 
Consumers were not only deceived and treated unfairly, they were 
abused by sellers who tried to get them to act unreasonably.75 A few months 
later, when the Dodd-Frank legislation became law, it included the 
Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), which created the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.76 The CFPA transferred from the 
FTC to the Bureau the FTC’s rulemaking authority with respect to 
consumer financial products.77 At its creation, the CFPB received authority 
                                                                                                                 
 73. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Wall Street Reform at Cooper 
Union (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks 
-president-wall-street-reform. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. (noting that "a few companies made out like bandits by exploiting their customers").  
 76. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1001–1100H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955–2113 (2010) 
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); id. § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5531). The CFPB was authorized as an independent bureau within the Federal Reserve—
statutorily insulated from the Federal Reserve’s authority and supervision. Id. § 1101, 124 Stat. at 
1964 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491). The Federal Reserve funds the CFPB, but the Bureau sets its 
own budget. Id. § 1017(b), 124 Stat. at 1977–78 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5497). The CFPB has a 
single director who serves a five-year term. Id. § 1011(b), 124 Stat. at 1964 (codified at 12. U.S.C. 
§ 5491(b)). The Director was, by statute, designated to be appointed by the President with 
confirmation from the Senate. Id. § 1011(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1964 (codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5491(b)(2)). In an effort to force Congress to diminish the autonomy of the Bureau, Senate 
Republicans declined, through procedural maneuvers, to permit confirmation of the actual 
nominee, Richard Cordray. See Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama 
Appoints Consumer Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010, at A1. The President nonetheless appointed 
Cordray as Director through a recess appointment. Id. Most of the arguments currently being 
made about the legitimacy of the Bureau, the enforceability of its rules and regulations, and the 
transferability of some other agencies’ regulatory authority pursuant to the enabling statute stem 
from this series of events. 
 77. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the FTC retained its authority to enforce those rules and to 
continue defining acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive with regards to non-depository 
institutions. Dodd-Frank Act § 1061(b)(5), 124 Stat. at 2036–38 (codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5581(b)(5)). Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.” Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). The FTC also has 
the authority to enforce rules prescribed by the CFPB under its “unfair, deceptive or abusive” 
authority as to entities in its jurisdiction. Dodd-Frank Act § 1061(b)(5), 124 Stat. at 2036–38. The 
CFPB is required to coordinate its rulemaking with the FTC to ensure that there is no overlap or 
conflicts between the two agencies. Id; see also FTC & CFPB, MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
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from eighteen consumer protection statutes and regulations that were 
previously covered by many other agencies.78 
The CFPB had been delegated considerable power to regulate consumer 
financial products—more than the FTC possessed when consumer financial 
products were within its jurisdiction. In addition to granting the Bureau the 
authority to issue regulations prohibiting “unfair or deceptive” acts or 
practices, Congress, as mentioned above, added the word “abusive” and 
included within its grant of authority extensive rulemaking, examination, 
and enforcement power. 79  The CFPB announced that its enforcement 
standard for unfair and deceptive practices would be consistent with the 
FTC’s 1980 actions and its 1983 Policy Statement.80 In guidance that it 
                                                                                                                 
PROTECTION BUREAU (2012) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/01/120123ftc-cfpb-mou.pdf. 
 78. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002, 124 Stat. at 1957 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481) (defining 
“enumerated consumer laws”). The agencies that gave up some or all of their power to the CFPB 
include the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Association, the Director of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. These consumer agencies 
all add their own interpretations of who a reasonable consumer is and who the agency ought to be 
protecting. The date that this authority was meant to transfer to the CFPB was designated as the 
“transfer date.” See id. § 1062, 124 Stat. at 2039 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5582). Prior to the 
appointment of the Bureau Director, the Secretary of the Treasury had interim authority to run the 
CFPB. Id. § 1066, 124 Stat. at 2055 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5586). The Treasury Secretary set 
July 21, 2011 as the designated date. See Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252, 57,252 
(Sept. 20, 2010). 
 79. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031, 124 Stat. at 2005–06 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).  
The Bureau may take any action authorized . . . to prevent a covered person or service 
provider from committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice 
under Federal law in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer 
financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service. 
Id.  
 80. See generally CFPB, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, at UDAAP 1–10 
[hereinafter, CFPB EXAM MANUAL] (summarizing CFPB position on Unfair, Deceptive, or 
Abusive Acts or Practices (UDAAP)). To declare a practice unlawful because it is unfair, the 
Bureau must have “a reasonable basis to conclude that—(A) the act or practice causes or is likely 
to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and (B) 
such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.” 
Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified in 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)). The CFPB 
standard is consistent with the FTC standard. Although “the Bureau may consider established 
public policies as evidence . . . [s]uch considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such 
determination.” Id. § 1031(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(2)). No 
definition for “deceptive” is provided in the Dodd-Frank Act. But, the CFPB has provided that: 
 
  A representation, omission, actor practice is deceptive when: 
(1) The representation, omission, act, or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the 
consumer; 
(2) The consumer’s interpretation of the representation, omission, act, or practice is 
reasonable under the circumstances, and 
(3) The misleading representation, omission, act, or practice is material.  
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issued, the CFPB stated that “[a]lthough abusive acts also may be unfair or 
deceptive, . . . the legal standards for abusive, unfair, and deceptive each are 
separate.”81 It proceeded to issue general guidelines describing the way in 
which the new term “abusiveness” would be regulated.82 
And so, going forward, the CPFB stands in a position to move “back to 
the future”: to reformulate the definitions of unfairness and deception in 
order to bring them in line with the developments that have occurred in 
cognitive psychology and consumer behavior within the last thirty years. It 
also has the authority to develop the “abusiveness” standard to focus on 
sellers’ abuse of consumers. 
IV.  POLICY SHIFT: INCORPORATING BEHAVIORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY INTO THE CFPB’S AGENCY 
JURISPRUDENCE 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to develop in detail the way in 
which the new agency should redevelop unfairness and deception and 
develop a new standard for abusiveness. But query how differently the 
marketplace would look if the CFPB could establish a standard that shifts 
attention from whether buyers could have avoided injury by behaving 
reasonably to whether sellers could have avoided confusing consumers by 
conveying information fairly. Why not make it plain that, in the case of 
deceptiveness, unfairness, and abusiveness, the CFPB will, assuming other 
elements of the offense are established, prosecute financial institutions 
whose representations and agreements have the effect of exploiting known 
cognitive limitations and that cause substantial injuries to consumers?83 
                                                                                                                 
CFPB EXAM MANUAL, supra, at UDAAP 5 (citing the FTC Policy Statement on Deception 
and instructing that “[e]xaminers should be informed by the FTC’s standard for deception”). 
Cooperation and consultation between the CFPB and the FTC in providing guidance in these 
matters is mandatory. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 77. 
 81. CFPB EXAM MANUAL, supra note 80, at UDAAP 9.  
 82. An abusive act or practice is defined as one that:  
 Materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition 
of a consumer financial product or service or 
o Takes unreasonable advantage of— 
 A lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the 
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;  
 The inability of the consumer to protect its interests in 
selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; or  
 The reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person 
to act in the interests of the consumer. 
CFPB EXAM MANUAL, supra note 80, at UDAAP 9. 
 83. If the regulations were reoriented in the manner suggested here, financial institutions might 
argue that the suggested approach infringes a First Amendment right to exaggerate or puff. See 
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 467 (1988). However, “[t]he common theme that 
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Of course, such a rule would not resolve important issues of line-
drawing. Pricing a product at $9.99 instead of $10, for example, leads many 
consumers to frame a product as a $9 product instead of a $10 product, and 
has the effect of exploiting a known cognitive limitation that can cause an 
injury to consumers. 
Reasonable minds may differ as to whether injuries caused by these 
cognitive deceptions are substantial, but shifting to a standard for 
truthfulness that corresponds to our actual understanding of consumer 
behavior would revolutionize the marketplace.  
  
                                                                                                                 
seems to run through cases considering puffery in a variety of contexts is that consumer reliance 
will be induced by specific rather than general assertions.” Cook, Perkins & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. 
Collection Serv., 911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 1990). A statement that is quantifiable—that makes a 
claim as to the “specific or absolute characteristics of a product”—is actionable. Id. at 245. A 
prohibition of unspecific assertions that have the effect of misleading has been upheld against a 
First Amendment challenge. See id. 
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